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remains disputable whether and how elaborative encoding pro-
cesses would generate novel associations during sleep.
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Abstract: During dreaming, as well as during wakefulness, elaborative
encoding, indexing and ancient art of memory (AAOM) techniques,
such as the method of loci, may coincide with emotion regulation. These
techniques shed light on the link between dreaming and emotional
catharsis, post-traumatic stress disorder, supermemorization during
sleep as opposed to wakefulness, and the developmental role of rapid
eye movement (REM) sleep in children.
Llewellyn’s thorough description of rapid eye movement (REM)
dreaming as elaborative encoding for episodic memories provides
a convincing argument for the value of the ancient art of memory
(AAOM) principles. Our commentary presents a complementary
aspect of the dream, arguing that it is not solely “the stuff of
memory,” but also that of emotion regulation. Although her argu-
ments lack an explicit link to the role of emotion in dreaming, Lle-
wellyn does indirectly provide methods for understanding the
process and purpose of emotion regulation in REM dreaming,
which we explore in this commentary.
The psychological models of dreaming suggest that dreams are
constructed from one’s emotional history and serve partly to regu-
late emotions, because the dreamer is forced to look, feel, and
reprocess emotional memory. During a dream, the activation of
the medial prefrontal cortex would play a role in the attribution
of thoughts and emotions to oneself and to characters and situ-
ations of the dream, while the deactivation of the inferior parietal
regions would enable the dreamer to experience the dream in the
ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives. This ofﬂine role-playing
would facilitate the resolution of internal conﬂict, which some
assimilate to an emotional catharsis (Desseilles et al. 2010;
2011a; 2011b; 2012).
During lucid dreams, as in themethod of loci, the dreamer con-
structs the dream scene and participates in the action while sim-
ultaneously being an observer. The role of the dream scene
could, in certain cases, be a task of memory, memorization, recol-
lection, and association. As an Aristotelian catharsis (Desseilles
et al. 2011a), this theater-like staging could enable the dreamer
to gain an outside perspective on certain behaviors, preoccupa-
tions, and problems present during wakefulness. Once lucid drea-
mers sufﬁciently identify, they could engage in mechanisms of
regulation (functional or dysfunctional) of emotions, such a reap-
praisal, suppression, or rumination, without having to await wake-
fulness, as do nonlucid dreamers when they engage in the
conscious regulation of emotions based on memories of dreams.
The capacity of lucid dreamers to modify the course of their
dreams could impact Llewellyn’s theory, since she hypothesizes
that following the elaborative encoding of recent memories with
remote ones during REM dreams, the hippocampus may instanti-
ate internal cortical junctions during non-REM sleep. Lucid drea-
mers could perhaps control elaborative encoding and thus change
the quality of indexing, modifying the associations that could be
recovered during wakefulness. The method of loci would there-
fore facilitate the regulation of emotions through an Aristotelian
catharsis during the lucid dream (Zadra & Pihl 1997) by acting
directly on the mnemonic composition and hippocampal
indexes. This online aspect of mnemonic composition would
suggest that the use of the method of loci during wakefulness
(enabling a ﬁrst- or third-person perspective), whether or not
combined with the induction of a lucidity during dreams
(Stumbrys et al. 2012), could enable the dreamer subsequently
to modulate more efﬁciently the emotional content associated
with memories. The nonlucid dream would also play a cathartic
role in emotion regulation, with REM sleep reducing the brain’s
reactivity to waking emotional experiences, simultaneously
decreasing the intensity of previous affective experiences and dimin-
ishing subjective emotionality on the subsequent day (van der Helm
et al. 2011b).
Emotion regulation could also emerge from indexing, which
enables a more practical and rapid return of detailed material
and facilitates the processing of new material through its anchoring
to remote memories. Unsuccessful indexing would therefore lead
to a more difﬁcult return to remote memories, which is what Lle-
wellyn suggests, and to poor processing of the material, which
would linger freely. The work of bonding and indexing is particu-
larly important in traumatic memory and post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), where the hypermemory of a traumatic event is
present as much in dreams as in wakefulness. The recurrence of
dreams linked to the traumatic event suggests that elaborative
encoding and indexing are deﬁcient. In fact, emotional hypersensi-
tivity and endangerment of the self could inhibit elaborative encod-
ing through hyperassociations to other memory episodes, leading to
an absence of bonding. The traumatic memory episode remaining
isolated and unassociated would thus not be indexed, reduced, and
processed. The linking of the traumatic event would need to be
carried out during wakefulness, for example by using imagery
rehearsal therapy (Harb et al. 2012), so as potentially to modify
both elaborative encoding and indexing. In the context of PTSD,
Roisin (2003; 2010) considers the exhortation of the desire to live
as an essential action in the psychological growth of individuals
having suffered a traumatic experience. When this desire resur-
faces, post-traumatic symptoms disappear. Roisin therefore seems
to link desire to elaborative encoding during wakefulness.
Through its emotional salience, desire, like the dream, would con-
tribute to emotional regulation.
Llewellyn’s article suggests that we all have supermemorizer
talents in our sleep, but not necessarily when awake. Explicit
memorization that is largely superior to normal can be
accompanied by emotional or social difﬁculties, like Asperger’s
syndrome of the autism spectrum (as in Daniel Tammet
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2007)), or like savant syndrome (as in Kim
Peek (Treffert & Christensen 2005)). Moreover, memorizers
and individuals with Asperger’s syndrome would not think of
these AAOM rules (Tammet 2007) because they do not explicitly
use them. Rather, the rules would function autonomously during
wakefulness, as they do during sleep in the general population.
Perhaps forgetting most of our dreams would serve to preserve
our mental resources for surrounding stimuli during wakefulness,
so as to not be distracted by our inner world. Therefore, could for-
getting our dreams be necessary to our cognitive and emotional
balance? If the AAOM enables the regulation of emotions
through catharsis or indexing, should it remain predominantly
nonconscious so as not to hinder social relations?
In addition to remaining at a level of implicit memorization, the
use of the AAOM during REM sleep should increase with the
quantity of information that confronts the individual. We could
imagine that children highly exposed to new information would
require increased processing in order to strengthen anchoring
and increase their ability to remember. As we know that REM
sleep is more predominant in infants (Marcus et al. 2008), we
could propose a developmental perspective on the necessity of
assimilating a varying quantity of episodes (episodic memory) to
retrieve. Thus, in addition to forgetting, the increase of anchoring
in infants could be necessary to their cognitive and emotional
development, particularly in the context of social relationships.
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